FIRST DIVISION
|
alejandro moraga, represented
by ENRIQUE MORAGA, petitioner, - versus - SPs. JULIAN
and Felicidad somo, sps. reynaldo and carmelita fernandez, and gil and herminigilda Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 166781 Present: PANGANIBAN,
C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: September 5, 2006 |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Enrique Moraga, seeks to nullify
and set aside the 23 April 2004 Decision[1]
and 11 January 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70051 which
reversed and set aside the Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 5086 dated 11 January 2001.
The property in dispute is a parcel
of agricultural land consisting of 1.7467 hectares which is located in Pandayan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, and covered under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-5926 in the name of Victoriano Ipapo who died on
On P10,000.00 per Bilihan Tuluyan of even date.
Inasmuch as an affidavit of consent
of the tenant is required by the agrarian laws in the transfer of title,
Alejandro Moraga on
Unknown to respondents, on
On
Respondents alleged in their
complaint, among other things, the following: (1) that the proceedings leading to the issuance
of the CLT in favor of Alejandro Moraga were irregular, i.e., the issuance of such CLT was based on a fraudulent or false
certification of the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan stating
that the total landholding of their predecessor-in-interest, Victoriano Ipapo, was 9.2986
hectares, when in truth and in fact, it was only 6.3197 hectares, (2) that the CLT was issued in violation of respondents’ and/or Victoriano Ipapo’s retention
rights, 3) that the tenants, the Moragas violated
their obligations as tenants.
Finding that the EP was issued not in
accordance with Presidential Decree No. 27 and that the Moragas
violated their obligations as tenants of the subject landholding, the
Provincial Adjudicator, in a decision dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1.
Finding the
landholding of the late Victoriano Ipapo not covered by P.D. 27. Accordingly, EP No. 496453 issued in favor of
Alejandro Moraga is hereby recalled and cancelled.
2.
Ordering
defendant Alejandro Moraga and all other persons acting in his behalf to vacate
the premises in question for the peaceful possession of the plaintiff.[2]
The Moragas
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit.
The Moragas
then appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In the meantime, respondents filed an
application for retention with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) which
was opposed by petitioner Enrique Moraga.
In an Order dated
Petitioner appealed to the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform who affirmed the decision of the Regional Director in an
Order dated
Unfazed, petitioner appealed the
ruling of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to the Court of Appeals. Said appealed ruling of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform was consolidated by the Court of Appeals with the appealed
decision of the DARAB in Case No. 567-Bul ’93. The consolidated cases were docketed as
CA-G.R. No. SP No. 38445.
In a Decision dated
While the CA-G.R. SP No. 38445 was still
pending before the Court of Appeals, petitioner and Mercedes Moraga, on 6 April
1995, filed before the Provincial
Adjudicator of Malolos, Bulacan,
a complaint for Redemption against respondents which was docketed as DARAB Case
No. 927-Bul ’95. The complaint alleged
that upon Alejandro Moraga’s death, the Moragas
succeeded Alejandro Moraga as tenants over the parcel of land that is the subject of the
controversy. It was likewise averred
that the sale entered into between Victoriano Ipapo and respondents on
In a Decision dated 23 November 1995,
the Provincial Adjudicator, taking into consideration the earlier ruling of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 38445, which affirmed the judgment of the DARAB ordering
Alejandro Moraga to vacate the premises of land in question and the order of the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform granting respondents’ application for retention,
opined that the case for redemption has been rendered moot and academic
inasmuch as respondents, by virtue of the said ruling of the Court of Appeals,
had acquired vested rights over the subject property. Accordingly, such vested
rights entitled respondents to exercise all the attributes of ownership, hence,
said property is beyond the reach of redemption. The Provincial Adjudicator further argued that
even if the action for redemption may be availed of, the same is still barred
by prescription considering that the Moragas
exercised the said right only after 22 years had lapsed.
On appeal, the DARAB in Case No.
927-Bul ’95 affirmed with modification the decision of the Provincial
Adjudicator. The DARAB, while sustaining the Provincial Adjudicator’s ruling
that the Moragas’ right to redeem has prescribed, stated
that the heirs of Alejandro Moraga shall remain as tenants and are entitled to
security of tenure, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision
is hereby MODIFIED declaring the heirs of the late Alejandro Moraga, herein
plaintiffs, are not entitled to redeem the subject property. However, they shall remain as tenants thereof
entitled to security of tenure.[3]
The Moragas
filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision denying their
claim for redemption.
Respondents likewise filed a motion
for reconsideration of the said decision insofar as it decreed that Alejandro
Moraga’s heirs shall “remain tenants entitled to security of tenure.”
Both motions were denied by the
DARAB.
Hence, both parties appealed to the
Court of Appeals.
The appeal of the Moragas
which assailed the DARAB decision denying their claim for redemption was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63895, while the appeal of respondents questioning
the DARAB decision ordering the heirs of Alejandro Moraga to “remain as tenants
entitled to security of tenure” was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70051.
In a decision dated
On the other hand, the Sixth Division
of the Court of Appeals, in resolving the sole issue in CA-G.R. SP No. 70051
on whether or not the DARAB is correct
in ordering that the heirs of Alejandro Moraga remain as tenants in the subject
landholding, ruled for the respondents. It
ratiocinated that the DARAB committed palpable error in decreeing that
Alejandro Moraga’s heir “shall remain as tenants entitled to security of
tenure” considering that the said ruling alters the already final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 38445, enunciating that the Moragas are not
entitled to security of tenure for violating their obligations as tenants.
Undeterred, petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration of the above decision.
The Court of Appeals did not budge from its stand and denied the motion
in a Resolution dated
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner submitted the following
issues:
A
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER HAS A RIGHT OF REDEMPTION
OVER THE LANDHOLDING SUBJECT OF THE INSTANT CASE;
B
IF IN THE NEGATIVE, WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER SHALL
REMAIN AS TENANT OF THE LANDHOLDING ENTITLED TO SECURITY OF TENURE;
C
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS HAVE A LEGAL RIGHT TO EJECT
PETITIONER FROM THE LANDHOLDING IN QUESTION;
D
IF IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS
ENTITLED TO DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION.[4]
As gleaned from the issues presented
by petitioner, it is quite evident that petitioner would want this Court to
revisit the final and executory decisions of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38445, where petitioner’s claim of security
of tenure was settled, and in CA-G.R. SP No. 63895 which resolved petitioner’s
complaint for redemption. However, this
cannot be done by this Court without violating the doctrine of res judicata.
In Spouses Barretto v. Court of Appeals,[5]
this Court elucidated the doctrine of res judicata in this fashion:
Section 47, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court, provides:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. –
The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the
x x x
x
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is,
with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that
could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same
title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties
or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a
former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto.
The aforecited rule in point
embodies the fundamental principles of res judicata, finality of judgment and estoppel
by judgment, which means that once a judgment has become final and executory, the issues therein litigated upon are laid to
rest.
The doctrine of res judicata is of two aspects. The first aspect is the effect of a judgment
as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, damand or cause of action.
The second aspect precludes the relitigation
of a particular fact or issue in another action between the same parties or
their successors in interest, on a different claim or cause of action.
Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City[6] further explained:
The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1)
bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.
The second concept – conclusiveness of judgment -
states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was
there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the
parties to that action and persons in privity with
them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between
such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while
the judgment remains unreversed by proper
authority. It has been held that in
order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter
in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential
that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in
the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that
particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or
their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or
question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. x x
x.
Res judicata is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public and sound practice that at the risk of occasional
error, the judgments of courts must become final at some definite date set by
law.[7] After the judgment has become final, nothing
can be done therewith; otherwise there can be no end to litigation, thus
setting at naught the main role of courts, which is to assist in the
enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order, by
settling justiciable controversies with finality.[8]
In the case under consideration, it
bears stressing that the Court of Appeals came out with its Decision, dated
On the second issue, evidences adduced reveal that
defendant Alejandro Moraga failed to pay rentals from 1990 up to the present.
Under Presidential Decree 816, a tenant who deliberately refuses to pay rentals
for two consecutive years can be ejected. Section 2 thereof provides:
“Any agricultural lessee of a rice or corn land under
PD 27 who deliberately refuses and/or continues to refuse to pay rental or
amortization payments when they fail due for a period of two years, shall [upon]
hearing and [final] judgment, forfeit the certificate of land transfer issued
in his favor, if his landholding is already covered by such certificate of land
transfer.”
Thirdly, tenant Alejandro Moraga aside from being
remiss in paying his rental has allowed third person to occupy portions of his
landholding without informing the landowners.
These to the mind of the Board are acts inimical to the right and
obligation of the tenant to pursue and protect his landholding from any trespassers
or would be occupant without the knowledge and consent of the landowners. In this regard, the Board finds, defendant
Alejandro Moraga to have violated his obligations as a tenant to warrant his ejectment therefore.
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
x x x
x
2. Ordering defendant Alejandro Moraga and all other
persons acting in his behalf to vacate the premises in question for the
peaceful possession of the plaintiff.[9]
Petitioner, however, insinuated that
in the same decision for ejectment in CA-G.R. SP No.
38445, the Court of Appeals made a pronouncement that petitioner remains as
tenant of the landholding, viz:
Finally, with the finding that the Emancipation Patent
issued to Alejandro Moraga was void, petitioners’ status will revert back to
being tenants and thus are liable for the payment of the corresponding rentals,
including the unpaid rentals which, from the evidence adduced, was from 1990.[10]
Contrary to what petitioner believed,
the said portion of the body of the decision is merely an obiter dictum. In fact, the dispositive portion of the decision categorically upholds
the eviction of petitioner. If indeed,
it was pronounced in the said decision that petitioner were to remain as
tenant, then the dispositive portion of the same
would not have upheld petitioner’s eviction.
It should be remembered that while the body of a decision, order or
resolution might create some ambiguity regarding which way the court’s
reasoning propenderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that finally invests rights
upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes
the corresponding duties and obligations.[11]
Since CA-G.R. SP No. 38445 resolved the
issue of security of tenure and ordered petitioner’s eviction, this Court can
no longer entertain petitioner’s attempt to re-litigate the same on the ground
of res judicata.
In a zealous attempt to salvage his
case for redemption, petitioner insisted that the late Victoriano
Ipapo failed to inform petitioner’s deceased father
in writing and the DAR of the sale of the land in question in violation of Section
12 of Republic Act No. 6389, amending Sections 11 and 12 of Republic Act No.
3844, to wit:
Sec. 12. Lessee’s
Right to Redemption. In case the
landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural
lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable
price and consideration; Provided,
that where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled
to said right of redemption only to [the] extent of the area actually
cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised
within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served by
the vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon
the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of
legal redemption. The redemption price
shall be the reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale.
By raising this issue, petitioner is
trying to resuscitate the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63895,
dated
It must be noted that the purpose of the written
notice required by law is to remove all uncertainties as to the sale, its terms
and its validity, and to quiet any doubts that the alienation is not
definitive. The law however, does not
prescribe any particular form of notice, nor any distinctive method for
notifying the redemptioner. So long as the redemptioner
is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof, the period for
redemption will start running. x x x A copy of the deed of sale, in an authentic form, will
satisfy the requirement of the law and serve the purpose thereof.
It is worthy to note that the petitioners have secured
a copy of the said Deed of Sale and attached the same in their Answer dated
October 20, 1993 in DARAB Case No. 567-Bul ’93.
Thus, it is proper to reckon the period of redemption on
Even assuming that their right to redeem the property
has not prescribed, however, by virtue of the Sinumpaang
Salaysay executed by Alejandro Moraga on
Said issue on redemption having
attained finality, petitioner’s effort to modify the same is barred by res judicata.
Petitioner, likewise, assails the
In fine, the DARAB committed a palpable error in
decreeing that Alejandro’s heirs “shall remain as tenants (of the landholding)
entitled to security of tenure.”[13]
A scrutiny of the genesis of CA-G.R.
SP No. 63895 and CA-G.R. SP No. 70051 is enlightening. As already mentioned, these two cases
originated from a single complaint for redemption filed by petitioner and his
mother before the Provincial Adjudicator of Malolos, Bulacan on 6 April 1995, docketed as DARAB Case No. 927-Bul
’95. In the pleadings filed by petitioner
before the Provincial Adjudicator, he did not raise the issue of security of
tenure. Thus, the Provincial
Adjudicator, in resolving the case confined his decision on the sole issue of
whether petitioner and his mother can redeem the subject property. He ruled they cannot. When DARAB Case No. 927-Bul ’95 was elevated
to the DARAB, security of tenure was also a non-issue in the pleadings of the
parties. However, the DARAB, instead of
confining itself to the sole issue at hand, veered away and ventured into the
realm of an unraised question, i.e., the issue of security of tenure. This actuation of the DARAB prompted
respondents to appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
70051, questioning the DARAB decision that ordered the heirs of Alejandro
Moraga to “remain as tenants entitled to security of tenure.”
On the other hand, petitioner
appealed the same decision of the DARAB denying him the right to redeem the
property. Petitioner’s appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63895.
While the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 70051, limited itself to the issue presented by petitioner, the contrary
happened in CA-G.R. SP No. 63895, when the Court of Appeals fell into the same pitfall
as the DARAB in fiddling with the issue of security of tenure. This conduct of the DARAB and the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63895 cannot be countenanced. First, it goes against the tenet that “courts
of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue.”[14] A judgment that goes outside the issues and
purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties,
is not only irregular but also extra-judicial and invalid.[15] This norm does not only apply to courts but
also to quasi-judicial bodies such as the DARAB.[16] Prescinding from
this rule, the DARAB ruling on security of tenure, which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63895, is therefore irrregular
and invalid. From this disquisition, it is readily clear that the decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 63895 is valid only insofar as it ruled that petitioner can no longer
exercise his right to redeem the said property. Res judicata is not applicable because CA-G.R. SP No.
63895, in effect, has no ruling on the issue of security of tenure which CA-G.R.
SP No. 70051 could have modified.
Anent petitioner’s claim of
disturbance compensation, suffice it to state that since this matter is brought
up for the first time in this Petition for Review, this Court cannot take
cognizance of the same. The settled rule is that matters or issues not raised
below cannot be raised before this Court for the first time.[17]
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate
Justice Associate
Justice
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
|
Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Noel G. Tijam, concurring.
[2] Rollo, p. 62.
[3]
[4]
[5] 381 Phil. 580, 588-589 (2000).
[6] G.R. No. 76265,
[7] Alabanzas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74697,
[8]
[9] Rollo, pp. 61-62.
[10]
[11] Dy Pac Pakiao Workers
[12] Rollo, p. 98.
[13]
[14] Mon
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118292,
[15] Bernas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85041,
[16] Department
of Agrarian Reform v. Franco, G.R. No. 147479,
[17]